public-encrypt
browserify version of publicEncrypt & privateDecrypt
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established crypto-browserify package by known author cwmma; inflated semver reflects single-version registry snapshot of a mature package, not spam behavior. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.3 | 6 / 3 | |
| 4.0.2 | 5 / 2 | |
| 4.0.0 | 5 / 2 | |
| 3.0.0 | 5 / 2 | |
| 2.0.1 | 5 / 2 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 2 | |
| 1.1.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 2 |
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.