protobufjs-cli
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher with SLSA provenance; consistent with official CI/CD publishing for this established package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-spawn | AI (semgrep): CLI tool legitimately spawns jsdoc via child_process; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): pbjs intentionally supports user-specified custom targets via --target flag; dynamic require is a documented feature, not a security risk for this CLI tool. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): pbts uses child_process to invoke jsdoc for TypeScript definition generation; this is the documented and expected behavior of this CLI tool. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-exec | AI (semgrep): child_process.exec is used to run jsdoc (a declared dependency) for TypeScript generation; command is constructed from known paths, not arbitrary user input. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:semver | AI (phantom-deps): semver is a declared runtime dependency in package.json; phantom-dep finding is a false positive likely due to indirect import patterns. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.5.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 2.4.2 | 10 / 1 | |
| 2.4.1 | 10 / 1 | |
| 2.4.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 2.3.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 2.2.1 | 10 / 1 | |
| 2.2.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 2.0.3 | 10 / 1 | |
| 2.0.2 | 10 / 1 | |
| 2.0.1 | 10 / 1 | |
| 2.0.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 1.3.1 | 10 / 1 | |
| 1.3.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 1.2.2 | 10 / 1 | |
| 1.2.1 | 10 / 1 | |
| 1.1.2 | 10 / 1 |
v2.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.