progress
Flexible ascii progress bar
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:forsvikgroup.com | AI (email-domain): Stale maintainer email from a decade-old package; no active compromise indicators. The domain risk is theoretical and does not affect this stable, widely-trusted package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from prezjordan to thebigredgeek in 2017 is a documented legitimate maintainer transition for the visionmedia/node-progress package. thebigredgeek has 47 approved packages and is an established npm publisher. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers (thebigredgeek, thejameskyle) reflect the same 2017 legitimate handoff of the visionmedia/node-progress package. No suspicious code changes accompanied the transition. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 15+ years old with 20 versions; lack of Sigstore provenance is expected for this era and not a meaningful risk signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-10-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-04-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.8
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'forsvikgroup.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.7
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'forsvikgroup.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.1.6
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'forsvikgroup.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-06-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.1.5
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'forsvikgroup.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.1.4
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'forsvikgroup.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.1.3
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'forsvikgroup.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-12-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.1.2
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'forsvikgroup.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-10-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.1.0
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'forsvikgroup.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-09-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.