preact-render-to-string
Render JSX to an HTML string, with support for Preact components.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/jsx-entry.js | AI (source-diff): dist/ files are standard microbundle minified build outputs for preact-render-to-string; content is recognizable preact rendering logic with no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/commonjs.js | AI (source-diff): dist/ files are standard microbundle minified build outputs for preact-render-to-string; content is recognizable preact rendering logic with no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index2.js | AI (source-diff): dist/ files are standard microbundle minified build outputs for preact-render-to-string; content is recognizable preact rendering logic with no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/jsx.modern.js | AI (source-diff): dist/jsx.modern.js is a microbundle-minified build artifact of src/jsx.js. Minified dist files are expected and documented in this package's build pipeline. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of inactive maintainers (lukeed, prateekbh, harmony, solarliner) is routine housekeeping for a long-lived Preact ecosystem package actively maintained by the Preact team. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/jsx/index.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard microbundle minified ESM output; JSX render logic with no malicious patterns. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/stream/index.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard microbundle minified ESM output; streaming render logic with no malicious patterns. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/jsx/commonjs.js | AI (source-diff): Standard microbundle minified output for preact-render-to-string; code is HTML rendering logic with no malicious patterns. This package always ships minified dist files. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/stream/index.js | AI (source-diff): Standard microbundle minified output; streaming render logic with no malicious patterns. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/jsx/index.module.js | AI (source-diff): Standard microbundle minified output; JSX render logic with no malicious patterns. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/stream/index.module.js | AI (source-diff): Standard microbundle minified output; streaming render logic with no malicious patterns. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): preactjs intentionally migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance attestation. The change from jdecroock to GitHub Actions reflects automated releases, not a compromise. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 121)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.7.0 | 0 / 21 | |
| 6.6.7 | 0 / 21 | |
| 6.6.6 | 0 / 21 | |
| 6.6.5 | 0 / 21 | |
| 6.6.4 | 0 / 21 | |
| 6.6.3 | 0 / 21 | |
| 6.6.2 | 0 / 21 | |
| 6.6.1 | 0 / 21 | |
| 6.6.0 | 0 / 21 | |
| 6.5.13 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.12 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.11 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.10 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.9 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.8 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.7 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.6 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.5 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.4 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.3 | 0 / 23 | |
| 6.5.2 | 1 / 21 | |
| 6.5.1 | 1 / 21 | |
| 6.4.2 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.4.1 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.4.0 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.3.1 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.3.0 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.2.2 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.2.1 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.2.0 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.1.0 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.0.3 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.0.2 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.0.1 | 1 / 20 | |
| 6.0.0 | 1 / 20 | |
| 5.2.6 | 1 / 19 | |
| 5.2.5 | 1 / 19 | |
| 5.2.4 | 1 / 19 | |
| 5.2.3 | 1 / 19 | |
| 5.2.2 | 1 / 19 | |
| 5.2.1 | 1 / 19 | |
| 5.2.0 | 1 / 19 | |
| 5.1.21 | 1 / 19 | |
| 5.1.20 | 1 / 19 | |
| 5.1.19 | 1 / 17 | |
| 5.1.18 | 1 / 17 | |
| 5.1.17 | 1 / 17 | |
| 5.1.16 | 1 / 17 | |
| 5.1.15 | 1 / 17 | |
| 5.1.14 | 1 / 16 | |
| 5.1.13 | 1 / 16 | |
| 5.1.12 | 1 / 18 | |
| 5.1.11 | 1 / 18 | |
| 5.1.10 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.1.9 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.1.8 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.1.7 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.1.6 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.1.5 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.1.4 | 1 / 15 | |
| 5.1.3 | 1 / 14 | |
| 5.1.2 | 1 / 14 | |
| 5.1.1 | 1 / 14 | |
| 5.1.0 | 1 / 14 | |
| 5.0.7 | 1 / 14 | |
| 5.0.6 | 1 / 14 | |
| 5.0.5 | 1 / 14 | |
| 5.0.4 | 1 / 13 | |
| 5.0.3 | 1 / 13 | |
| 5.0.2 | 1 / 13 | |
| 5.0.1 | 1 / 13 | |
| 5.0.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 4.1.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 4.0.1 | 1 / 13 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 3.8.2 | 1 / 13 | |
| 3.8.1 | 1 / 13 | |
| 3.8.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 3.7.2 | 1 / 20 | |
| 3.7.1 | 1 / 20 | |
| 3.7.0 | 1 / 20 | |
| 3.6.3 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.6.2 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.6.1 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.6.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.5.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.4.1 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.4.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.3.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.2.1 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.2.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.1.1 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.0.7 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.0.6 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.0.5 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.0.4 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.0.3 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.0.2 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 21 |
v6.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.3
7 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-02-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-11-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.2.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.2.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.5
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.3
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-09-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.2.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-08-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.20
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-02-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.1.19
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-04-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.1.18
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.1.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.14
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.