pkg-config
parse the closest `package.json` and get package specific configurations
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): This package has intentionally used 0.0.0 since its initial publish ~11 years ago; it's a deliberate versioning choice, not a malware indicator. 188.9k weekly downloads confirm legitimacy. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): The dynamic require is the package's core functionality — reading the nearest package.json. Path is derived from find-root, not user input. Stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.0 | 2 / 6 |
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.