pbkdf2-compat
This library provides the functionality of PBKDF2 with the ability to use any supported hashing algorithm returned from crypto.getHashes()
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from dcousens to cwmma (Calvin Metcalf) within crypto-browserify org, occurred in 2015. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process.fork used to offload CPU-intensive PBKDF2 computation to worker; standard pattern for this crypto library. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package last published in 2015, predates Sigstore provenance infrastructure. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 1 |
v4.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-02-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.