path-browserify
the path module from node core for browsers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate transfer from substack to browserify org maintainer goto-bus-stop, a well-established npm publisher. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Reflects browserify org team structure; maintainers are well-known community members. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): v0.0.0→v1.0.0 major version; size increase is the full path module implementation, entirely expected. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): path-browserify intentionally uses 0.0.0 as its stable version — a 12+ year old convention for this package, not a malicious indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by many years; 31.5M weekly downloads and substack authorship confirm legitimacy without attestation. | ai |
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-06-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.