parse5-html-rewriting-stream
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): 43081j is a known parse5 contributor with strong track record (151 approved, 0 rejected). Legitimate maintainer transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): 43081j added as maintainer for parse5 ecosystem packages; legitimate transition from original author. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established parse5 ecosystem package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
v8.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.