parents
return all the parent directories for a directory
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): substack commonly published packages at 0.0.0; this package is 13+ years old with 1.3M weekly downloads — clearly not a throwaway malicious package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates npm provenance attestation by many years; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 1 |
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.