package-manager-detector
Package manager detector
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package now publishes with SLSA provenance via CI/CD; missing gitHead is a side effect of the new publish environment, not a risk indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): antfu-collective packages intentionally transitioned to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing; SLSA provenance attestation confirms builds occur in verified CI environment. This pattern is stable for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): antfu (Anthony Fu) is a prolific legitimate OSS developer, not a spam publisher. S_KNOWN_SPAM_PUBLISHER is a false positive for this package. No-keywords is trivially benign for an established utility. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 23)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.6.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.5.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.4.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.4.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.3.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.2.11 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.2.10 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.2.9 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.2.8 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.2.7 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.2.6 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.2.5 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.2.4 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 10 |
v1.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.10
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.8
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.7
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-08-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-08-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.