osenv
Look up environment settings specific to different operating systems
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:dotenv | AI (typosquat): osenv is a legitimate, 13+ year old package by isaacs (npm creator) for OS environment lookups. Not a typosquat of dotenv — different purpose, different author, predates dotenv. | ai | |
| license | uncommon-license:BSD | AI (license): BSD is a well-known permissive license; the uncommon-license finding is a false positive for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): isaacs is the creator of npm; S_KNOWN_SPAM_PUBLISHER flag is a clear false positive for this publisher. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from iarna to isaacs is a transition between two well-known npm core maintainers; both are trusted. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process is core to osenv's purpose: falling back to shell commands (whoami, hostname) when env vars are unset. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; no CI/CD provenance expected for packages of this era. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 1 |
v0.1.5
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'aoaioxxysz.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-12-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-06-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-06-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-05-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.