ordered-emitter
emit events in order
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is substack's historical versioning style for early npm packages; this package is 14+ years old with a legitimate repo and author. Not a malware indicator. | ai | |
| license | uncommon-license:MIT/X11 | AI (license): MIT/X11 is a recognized permissive license variant; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 1 |
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.