opencollective
Official Command Line Interface for Open Collective
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): babel-polyfill is a well-known, legitimate Babel package. Its addition to this established utility package is not a suspicious dependency injection. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by years; absence of attestation is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
v1.0.3
2 findingsMaintainer email '@xdamman' uses domain 'xdamman' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
2 findingsMaintainer email '@xdamman' uses domain 'xdamman' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '@xdamman' uses domain 'xdamman' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.