only-shallow
like `deeper` and `deepest`, but less strict, and with 90s flavor
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:aoaioxxysz.net | AI (email-domain): Long-standing author email domain for this well-established package/publisher (othiym23); no evidence of domain takeover or identity change across 11 versions and ~11 years. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-established package predating Sigstore provenance; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 0 |
v1.2.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'aoaioxxysz.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.5
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'aoaioxxysz.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.4
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'aoaioxxysz.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.