nostics
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Intentional placeholder/name-reservation package by a trusted publisher; low-value signals are expected. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is used deliberately for placeholder reservations by this established publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.0 | 3 / 23 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 23 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 23 | |
| 0.0.4 | 3 / 21 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.