nodemon
Simple monitor script for use during development of a Node.js app.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): simple-update-notifier replaced update-notifier many versions ago; stable dep. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): windows-kill.exe is a long-standing part of nodemon for Windows process management. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Mature stable tool; infrequent publishes are normal, not suspicious. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): nodemon's postinstall configures user preferences via configstore; legitimate and documented for this development tool. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require loads package.json for version info; standard pattern in postinstall configuration. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process is core to nodemon's functionality of spawning and monitoring processes; expected and necessary. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:touch | AI (phantom-deps): touch is a declared runtime dependency used in nodemon's functionality; false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.14 | 10 / 11 | |
| 2.0.7 | 10 / 11 | |
| 2.0.6 | 10 / 11 | |
| 2.0.4 | 10 / 11 | |
| 2.0.3 | 10 / 11 | |
| 2.0.1 | 10 / 11 | |
| 2.0.0 | 10 / 11 |
v3.1.14
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/windows-kill.exe
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.7
2 findingsScript: node bin/postinstall || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.6
2 findingsScript: node bin/postinstall || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.4
2 findingsScript: node bin/postinstall || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.3
2 findingsScript: node bin/postinstall || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.1
2 findingsScript: node bin/postinstall || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
2 findingsScript: node bin/postinstall || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.