multiparty
multipart/form-data parser which supports streaming
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:coverage/lcov-report/prettify.js | AI (source-diff): This is Google's code-prettify library bundled with Istanbul lcov HTML report output, not obfuscated malicious code. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package published in 2014; missing gitHead is expected for older publish tooling. Author is the original package creator. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): fd-slicer is by the same author (andrewrk) and replaces removed deps; legitimate refactor in major version bump. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from superjoe (Andrew Kelley) to dougwilson in 2015; dougwilson is a trusted, prolific npm publisher in the Express ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; no CI/CD provenance expected for packages from this era. | ai |
Versions (showing 41 of 41)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 4.2.3 | 3 / 9 | |
| 4.2.2 | 3 / 9 | |
| 4.2.1 | 4 / 8 | |
| 4.2.0 | 4 / 7 | |
| 4.1.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 4.1.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 4.1.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 4.1.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 4.1.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.3.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 3.3.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.10 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.9 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.8 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.7 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.6 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.5 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.4 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.3 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.2 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.1 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.1.1 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.1.9 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.1.8 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.1.7 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.1.6 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.1.5 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.1.4 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.1.3 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.1.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 5 |
v4.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-01-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: superjoe.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-10-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-08-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.1
3 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: superjoe.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-07-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-07-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.10
3 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: dougwilson.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-07-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.8
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-06-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.7
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.6
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.