mocha
simple, flexible, fun test framework
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): joshuakgoldberg is a known mocha maintainer; legitimate transition within the mochajs org. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Mocha's CLI spawns child processes to run tests with node options — core functionality. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Informational only; mocha is a well-established package with verified maintainers. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Standard pattern for passing env to child worker processes in mocha's parallel execution; present since parallel support was added. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Mocha is a test runner that dynamically loads configs, test files, reporters, and interfaces by design. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:eval-usage | AI (semgrep): Deserializes options from mocha's own serialize-javascript output in worker IPC; not user-controlled input. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 218)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.7.6 | 21 / 62 | |
| 11.7.5 | 21 / 61 | |
| 11.7.4 | 21 / 61 | |
| 11.7.3 | 20 / 61 | |
| 11.7.2 | 20 / 61 | |
| 11.7.1 | 20 / 56 | |
| 11.7.0 | 20 / 56 | |
| 11.6.0 | 20 / 56 | |
| 11.5.0 | 20 / 56 | |
| 11.4.0 | 20 / 56 | |
| 11.3.0 | 20 / 56 | |
| 11.2.2 | 20 / 55 | |
| 11.2.1 | 20 / 55 | |
| 11.2.0 | 20 / 55 | |
| 11.1.0 | 20 / 54 | |
| 11.0.2 | 20 / 55 | |
| 11.0.1 | 20 / 55 | |
| 11.0.0 | 20 / 55 | |
| 10.8.2 | 20 / 54 | |
| 10.8.1 | 20 / 54 | |
| 10.8.0 | 20 / 54 | |
| 10.7.3 | 20 / 54 | |
| 10.7.0 | 20 / 60 | |
| 10.6.1 | 20 / 60 | |
| 10.6.0 | 20 / 61 | |
| 10.5.2 | 20 / 61 | |
| 10.5.1 | 20 / 61 | |
| 10.5.0 | 20 / 61 | |
| 10.4.0 | 20 / 62 | |
| 10.3.0 | 20 / 66 | |
| 10.2.0 | 21 / 70 | |
| 10.1.0 | 21 / 73 | |
| 10.0.0 | 22 / 73 | |
| 9.2.2 | 24 / 79 | |
| 9.2.1 | 24 / 79 | |
| 9.2.0 | 24 / 79 | |
| 9.1.4 | 24 / 80 | |
| 9.1.3 | 24 / 81 | |
| 9.1.2 | 24 / 81 | |
| 9.1.1 | 25 / 82 | |
| 9.1.0 | 25 / 82 | |
| 9.0.3 | 25 / 85 | |
| 9.0.2 | 25 / 85 | |
| 9.0.1 | 25 / 85 | |
| 9.0.0 | 25 / 85 | |
| 8.4.0 | 25 / 81 | |
| 8.3.2 | 25 / 81 | |
| 8.3.1 | 25 / 81 | |
| 8.3.0 | 25 / 81 | |
| 8.2.1 | 25 / 80 | |
| 8.2.0 | 25 / 80 |
v11.7.6
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v11.7.5
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/mochajs/mocha/blob/9a6a5db8401dec63ea81093dd862e9e9b13b44d0/lib/nodejs/buffered-worker-pool.js#L90 88 | ...forkOpts, 89 | // adds an incremental id to all workers, which can be useful to allocate resources for each process > 90 | env: {...process.env, MOCHA_WORKER_ID: counter++} 91 | } 92 | };
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.8.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.7.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-08-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v10.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-06-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-06-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v10.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-02-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v10.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.