mdast-util-visit
Deprecated
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Package is an intentional deprecation stub by trusted publisher wooorm; minimal metadata and tiny payload are expected for a tombstone release. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy before a deprecation publish is normal; wooorm is a long-standing trusted publisher with no account-takeover indicators. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Deprecation stubs are often published manually outside CI; missing gitHead is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: wooorm.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.