md4x
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Standard NAPI platform-specific binary loader pattern; stable for this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): md4x ships prebuilt NAPI binaries for multiple platforms as its core feature; expected and attested via SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:mobx | AI (typosquat): md4x is a markdown parser from unjs org; no plausible impersonation of mobx (state management lib). | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:toplevel-fetch | AI (semgrep): fetch() in cli.mjs is for fetching remote markdown input URLs — documented CLI feature, not exfiltration. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.25 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.24 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.23 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.22 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.21 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.20 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.19 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.18 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.17 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.16 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.15 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.12 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.11 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.10 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.9 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 8 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 8 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 8 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 8 |
v0.0.25
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.24
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.23
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.22
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.21
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.20
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.19
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.18
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.17
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.16
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.15
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.12
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64-musl.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • build/md4x.darwin-arm64.node • build/md4x.darwin-x64.node • build/md4x.linux-arm64.node • build/md4x.linux-x64.node • build/md4x.win32-arm64.node • build/md4x.win32-x64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.