markdown-it-table-of-contents
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/cmaas | AI (email-domain): Author field contains a GitHub URL, not an email address; domain-hijack concern does not apply. | ai |
v1.2.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/cmaas' uses domain 'https://github.com/cmaas' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/cmaas' uses domain 'https://github.com/cmaas' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/cmaas' uses domain 'https://github.com/cmaas' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.