mamacro
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Package is a legitimate minimal utility from a well-established publisher (xtuc) with 5 approved inbound dep edges and 8+ years in the registry; sparse metadata is not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Absence of description is a cosmetic issue for this established, trusted package; not a security concern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance on npm; lack of attestation is expected for packages of this age. | ai |
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.