loopback-connector
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established IBM/LoopBack package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:strong-globalize | AI (dependencies): strong-globalize is a StrongLoop/IBM utility historically used across the LoopBack ecosystem; stable dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.0.6 | 6 / 11 | |
| 7.0.5 | 6 / 11 | |
| 7.0.4 | 6 / 11 | |
| 7.0.3 | 6 / 11 | |
| 7.0.2 | 6 / 11 | |
| 7.0.1 | 6 / 11 | |
| 7.0.0 | 6 / 11 |
v7.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.