loggly
A client implementation for Loggly cloud Logging-as-a-Service API
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): json-stringify-safe is a well-known, benign utility package; its addition is contextually appropriate for a logging client handling circular references. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): jcrugzz was added as maintainer in 2013 as part of a legitimate Nodejitsu transition; stable historical fact with no ongoing risk. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from jcrugzz to indexzero occurred in Dec 2014; indexzero is the original author (Charlie Robbins) with a strong track record. This is a stable, decade-old legitimate handoff. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:timespan | AI (dependencies): timespan is a long-standing dependency of loggly; its use is consistent across versions and poses no material risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:request | AI (dependencies): request is a well-known, widely-used HTTP client library; its use in loggly is expected and stable across versions. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Package is published by indexzero, a long-standing trusted maintainer. Dormancy followed by a minor version bump with no material changes is not indicative of account takeover for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): loggly is a mature package predating Sigstore provenance; absence of attestation is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.8 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.7 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.6 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.5 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.6 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 0 |
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-12-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-12-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.