lodash.pick
The lodash method `_.pick` exported as a module.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:lodash.forin | AI (dependencies): lodash.forin is a canonical lodash sub-module published by the same author (jdalton); this dependency is a stable, legitimate part of the lodash modular package pattern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:lodash._pickbyarray | AI (dependencies): lodash._pickbyarray is a standard lodash internal modularized sub-package published by the same author (jdalton); not a real risk for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:lodash._pickbycallback | AI (dependencies): lodash._pickbycallback is a standard lodash internal modularized sub-package published by the same author (jdalton); not a real risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by years; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this well-established lodash module. | ai |
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.