lodash._baserandom
The modern build of lodash’s internal `baseRandom` as a module.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Lodash internal modular packages are by design tiny, dependency-free, keyword-less, and published at non-1.0.0 semver matching the lodash release. All signals are structural artifacts of the lodash-cli build system, not spam/phishing indicators. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 12+ years old, predating Sigstore provenance on npm. No provenance is expected for packages of this vintage. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.0 | 0 / 0 |
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.