locko
A simple in-process locking mechanism for critical sections of code.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Package is 7 years old with 22.7k weekly downloads and 6 versions; 0.0.0 is a stylistic choice, not an indicator of malice for this established package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lack of provenance is common (~88% of npm packages); no other risk signals present to elevate this concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 3 |
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.