level-ws
A basic writable stream for abstract-level databases
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from rvagg to juliangruber reflects the documented Level org community handoff; both are listed contributors. Legitimate transition, not a compromise. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): juliangruber and ralphtheninja are both listed contributors in package.json and are known Level ecosystem maintainers. Addition is consistent with the org transition. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance attestation; absence is expected for this era of publishing and not a risk signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.0.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.0 | 2 / 4 |
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-03-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.