level-post
get consistent post hooks for leveldb.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Tiny, minimal utility from a well-established maintainer (dominictarr); sparse metadata is characteristic of early-era npm packages, not spam or malice. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Missing description is a cosmetic issue for this old, legitimate utility package; not indicative of malicious intent. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.7 | 1 / 3 | |
| 1.0.5 | 1 / 3 | |
| 1.0.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 2 |
v1.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.