kubo
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Documented binary-download postinstall; stable pattern across all kubo versions. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process used in download.js for binary extraction; expected for this native binary wrapper. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.41.0 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.40.1 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.40.0 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.39.0 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.38.0 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.35.0 | 7 / 12 |
v0.41.0
2 findingsScript: node src/post-install.js
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.40.1
2 findingsScript: node src/post-install.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.40.0
2 findingsScript: node src/post-install.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.39.0
2 findingsScript: node src/post-install.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.38.0
2 findingsScript: node src/post-install.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.35.0
2 findingsScript: node src/post-install.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.