koa-favicon
favicon bounce middleware for koa
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition within koajs org from jongleberry to coderhaoxin in 2018; both are established koajs contributors. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): coderhaoxin is a long-standing koajs maintainer with strong track record (321 approved packages). | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; published in 2018 when attestation was not available. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.2.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-12-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.