koa-compose
compose Koa middleware
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): dead_horse is a known koajs org co-maintainer with extensive track record (554 approved packages, 4397 days). Legitimate maintainer transition. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Published in 2018, before Sigstore provenance existed. Informational only. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.2.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 4.1.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 4.0.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 3.2.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.5.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.5.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.4.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.3.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v4.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-09-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.