keytar
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:install | AI (install-scripts): prebuild-install || npm run build is the standard native addon install pattern for keytar; fetches prebuilt binaries or compiles via node-gyp. Stable and expected for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:node-addon-api | AI (phantom-deps): node-addon-api is a build-time/native dependency for N-API bindings; not directly imported in JS but legitimately required. False positive for native addons. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:prebuild-install | AI (phantom-deps): prebuild-install is a known implicit runtime/binary dependency for native addons; correctly flagged as such by the analyzer. Not a risk. | ai |
v7.9.0
2 findingsScript: prebuild-install || npm run build
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.