keygrip
Key signing and verification for rotated credentials
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from jed to dougwilson (well-known Express ecosystem maintainer) in 2017; stable for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Added maintainers (jongleberry, fishrock123, dougwilson) are recognized Node.js/Express community members; legitimate transfer. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 |
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-08-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.