keycloak-angular
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:mauriciovigolo | AI (email-domain): The email field contains a social handle (@mauriciovigolo), not an email address; no domain to hijack. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known Angular compiler implicit runtime dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 22.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 21.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 20.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 15.1.0 | 1 / 0 |
v22.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v21.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v15.1.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '@mauriciovigolo' uses domain 'mauriciovigolo' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.