karma-safari-launcher
A Karma plugin. Launcher for Safari.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition within karma-runner org; zzo is a trusted publisher with 407 approved packages and 11-year history. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers (zzo, dignifiedquire) are known contributors in the Karma ecosystem; legitimate transfer. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Stable browser launcher plugin; long dormancy is normal for mature packages with infrequent updates. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-05-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-08-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.3
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-07-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.