jspm-bower
Bower endpoint for jspm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from matthewp to guybedford occurred in Feb 2014 — a legitimate historical transition to the jspm ecosystem maintainer. No ongoing risk. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): guybedford is the canonical jspm maintainer; this addition in 2014 was a legitimate transfer, not a compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package was published in 2014, predating Sigstore provenance tooling. No provenance attestation is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
v0.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-02-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.