jasmine-only
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): davemo is the listed author in package.json and owns the GitHub repo; the 2015 transfer from searls to davemo is a legitimate handoff to the actual author, stable across versions. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require in Gruntfile.js is standard Lineman build tool integration (a devDependency); not runtime consumer code and poses no risk to package users. | ai | |
| license | uncommon-license:Apache License 2.0 | AI (license): Apache 2.0 is a well-known permissive open-source license; the uncommon flag is a false positive for this package. | ai |
v0.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-10-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-09-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.