isemail
Validate an email address according to RFCs 5321, 5322, and others
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Documented transition from original author hueniverse to hapijs org maintainer skeggse; repo remains under hapijs/isemail. Legitimate handoff. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer nlf added as part of hapijs org transition; consistent with legitimate org-level maintainer management. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): punycode is a well-known, legitimate dependency for IDN/internationalized email support; appropriate for an RFC-compliant email validator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Published in 2017, before Sigstore provenance was available on npm. Not actionable for this version. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.2.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.1.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.1.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.1.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.1.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 2.2.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 2.2.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 2.1.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 2 |
v3.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-06-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-07-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.