is-node
Detect if current process is a node application or not.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): is-node has used 0.0.0 as its canonical version for 12+ years with 60k weekly downloads; this is not a throwaway malicious package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-established package predating Sigstore provenance; absence of attestation is expected and not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package uses publishConfig.provenance=true with SLSA/Sigstore attestation, which supersedes gitHead as a supply chain integrity signal. This is a stable characteristic of this package's CI/CD setup. | ai |
v1.1.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: matthewh.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: matthewh.
v1.0.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'matthewh.in' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.