io.appium.settings
App for dealing with Android settings
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA attestation; consistent with Appium org's CI/CD practices. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decodes locale command response JSON; not an obfuscated payload. Stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:semver | AI (phantom-deps): semver is declared in dependencies; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 33 of 33)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.1.3 | 4 / 20 | |
| 7.1.2 | 4 / 20 | |
| 7.1.1 | 4 / 20 | |
| 7.1.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 7.0.28 | 5 / 21 | |
| 7.0.27 | 5 / 21 | |
| 7.0.26 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.25 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.24 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.23 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.22 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.21 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.20 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.19 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.18 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.17 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.16 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.15 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.14 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.13 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.12 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.11 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.10 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.9 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.8 | 6 / 22 | |
| 7.0.7 | 6 / 23 | |
| 7.0.6 | 6 / 23 | |
| 7.0.5 | 7 / 23 | |
| 7.0.4 | 7 / 22 | |
| 7.0.3 | 7 / 19 | |
| 7.0.2 | 7 / 19 | |
| 7.0.1 | 7 / 19 | |
| 7.0.0 | 7 / 19 |
v7.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.