import-in-the-middle
Intercept imports in Node.js
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:hex-decode | AI (semgrep): The hex decode is used to normalize module filenames for unique ID generation in the hook loader, not to decode or execute hidden payloads. Benign and stable for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing under the nodejs org with SLSA attestation — automated publishing is the expected new pattern for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects transition to CI/CD publishing under nodejs org; SLSA attestation and clean diff confirm legitimate release activity. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require of built-in module names is core to this package's interception functionality; stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 29 of 29)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.1 | 4 / 20 | |
| 3.0.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 2.0.6 | 4 / 20 | |
| 2.0.5 | 4 / 20 | |
| 2.0.4 | 4 / 20 | |
| 2.0.3 | 4 / 20 | |
| 2.0.2 | 4 / 20 | |
| 2.0.1 | 4 / 20 | |
| 2.0.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.15.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.14.4 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.14.3 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.14.2 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.14.1 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.14.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.13.2 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.13.1 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.13.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.12.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.11.3 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.11.2 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.11.1 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.11.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.10.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.9.1 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.9.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 1.8.1 | 4 / 18 | |
| 1.8.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 1.7.4 | 4 / 14 |
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.14.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.14.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.14.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.14.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.13.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.13.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.13.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-07-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.9.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-07-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.