https-browserify
https module compatability for browserify
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): https-browserify intentionally uses 0.0.0 as its version — a 12+ year old substack browserify shim with 9.9M weekly downloads. Version number reflects era conventions, not malicious intent. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by many years; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this established package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Well-known legitimate transfer from substack to feross, a highly trusted maintainer who took over many browserify ecosystem packages. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): feross and ptarjan are known, trusted maintainers added during the legitimate browserify ecosystem handoff. | ai |
v0.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-09-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.