http-assert
assert with status codes
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change (eivifj → jongleberry) occurred in 2014 and represents a historical, legitimate maintainer transition within the jshttp org. jongleberry is a well-known ecosystem contributor. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by many years; absence of attestation is expected for this era of package. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.1 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.3.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.1.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v1.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-05-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-12-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.