hat
generate random IDs and avoid collisions
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:hapi | AI (typosquat): 'hat' is a legitimate, intentional package name by substack, 14+ years old with 300k weekly downloads. Not a typosquat of hapi. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:got | AI (typosquat): 'hat' is a legitimate, intentional package name by substack, 14+ years old with 300k weekly downloads. Not a typosquat of got. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Version 0.0.0 is the genuine initial release of this 14-year-old package by substack. Not indicative of malicious intent. | ai |
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.