gzbz2
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:preinstall | AI (install-scripts): node-waf configure build is the standard native addon build command for old Node.js C++ bindings; entirely expected for this gzip/bzip2 native wrapper package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is ~15 years old, predating Sigstore provenance by many years; absence is expected and not a risk signal here. | ai |
v0.2.0
2 findingsScript: node-gyp clean || true; node-gyp configure build
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
2 findingsScript: node-waf configure build
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.