grunt-legacy-log-utils
Static methods for the Grunt 0.4.x logger.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition within the gruntjs org. krinkle is a highly trusted publisher (109 approved, 0 rejected). | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): krinkle is a known, trusted contributor to the Grunt ecosystem; legitimate transfer of maintenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.1.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.1.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.0.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 5 |
v2.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-05-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.