grunt-legacy-log
The Grunt 0.4.x logger.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): krinkle is a well-established npm publisher (108 approved packages, 0 rejected) with gruntjs org affiliation; transition from vladikoff appears legitimate. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): krinkle is a trusted, long-standing npm account with strong track record; addition is consistent with legitimate gruntjs org maintainer transition. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 3.0.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.0.2 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.0.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.1.3 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.1 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 5 |
v3.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.