grunt-known-options
The known options used in Grunt
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition within the Grunt team; vladikoff is a known Grunt contributor with strong track record. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Package is a simple config/data module that rarely needs updates; dormancy is expected for this package type. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Published in 2021 before Sigstore provenance was widely available; no security concern. | ai |
v2.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-05-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.