grunt-contrib-livereload
Reload assets live in the browser
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change cowboy→sindresorhus occurred in 2013 as part of a legitimate grunt-contrib ecosystem maintainer transition. sindresorhus is a highly trusted publisher with 6466 approved packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 13+ years old, predating Sigstore provenance attestation. No provenance is expected and not a risk signal for packages of this era. | ai |
v0.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.